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ABSTRACT 
 Implementation of systems engineering processes to improve design and 
performance requirements in physical security equipment federal specifications is a 
concept worth investigating. The Department of Defense composes federal specifications 
to supply the warfighter with approved products that are essential for the protection of 
classified information. In the past, it was common for physical security equipment 
specifications to require multiple amendments due to insufficient requirements or a lack 
of complete knowledge in end user needs. The thesis examines four physical security 
equipment specifications and develops an approach based on systems engineering 
methodologies to reduce the occurrence of amendments and deliver products that fully 
satisfy end user needs. The identification of problem statements and operational 
requirements, along with the execution of a stakeholder analysis, functional analysis, and 
subject matter expert interviews, found that a systems engineering approach can establish 
a more complete and standardized process to formulate equipment requirements. The 
General Services Administration will review the findings for possible implementation for 
future physical security equipment specifications. 
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The Department of Defense composes federal specifications to supply the 
warfighter with approved products essential for the protection of classified information. 
Currently, the Interagency Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE) examines the 
government needs, formulates a viable solution, documents the requirements in a 
completely new specification or an amendment to an existing specification, and submits 
for General Service Administration (GSA) approval. The process has resulted in viable 
products implemented in the field for decades, but GSA distributed several amendments 
and new federal specifications during that period to satisfy end user needs. Also, future 
technological advancements present the possible need for physical security equipment that 
has yet to be manufactured or even designed. Thus, the thesis examined the implementation 
of a systems engineering approach to standardize and document the federal specification 
requirements development process.  
This research analyzed four current specifications: FF-L-2740 Locks, Combination, 
Electromechanical, FF-L-2890 Lock Extensions (Pedestrian Door Lock Assembly 
Preassembled, Panic and Auxiliary Deadbolt), FF-P-110 Padlock Changeable 
Combination (Resistant to Opening by Manipulation and Surreptitious Attack) and AA-F-
358 Filing Cabinet, Legal and Letter Size, Uninsulated, Security. The appropriate systems 
engineering methods were determined to be problem statement identification, stakeholder 
and needs analysis, subject matter expert interviews, operational requirements analysis, 
and functional analysis. The methods represent a detailed step-by-step decomposition of 
end user needs into the required functions of the locking systems that provide a complete 
framework for all design and performance specification requirements. The functional 
analysis was the final step in the approach because either established policy or the 
discretion of GSA dictates quantitative values for specifications. However, the functions 
are critical to providing the incorporation of all necessary elements in the requirements.  
The research initially thought to improve the requirements development process by 
identifying missing functions that GSA could further examine. Unfortunately, without 
complete access to end users for observation and interviews with all stakeholders, absolute 
xvi 
detailed needs were unable to be gathered so all functions could not be confirmed. 
However, the unexpected value of the systems engineering approach was the recognition 
of additional tools that IACSE could incorporate in future requirements development. The 
inclusion of a needs analysis, testing documentation, and classified supplemental testing 
requirements along with the utilization of the analyses detailed in the research offer GSA 
an avenue to fully decompose and document specification requirements.  
The systems engineering approach added value to the requirements development 
by offering a structured framework from identifying and subsequently decomposing end 
user needs into functions that correlate into design and performance requirements 
manufacturers can design to. The intended improvements will decrease the amount of 
requirements required alterations and produce locking systems that fully meet end user 
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Product design can begin with fantastical ideas that creatively solve a problem or 
meet an existing need, such as the invention of a retina-scanning lock to secure all doors 
protecting classified information. However, before any design, much thought and analysis 
must be considered during the conceptual phase to ensure all functions are satisfied, proper 
design or performance requirements are established, all stakeholder needs are examined, 
and the design is feasible, along with other essential components. Experience has 
demonstrated that applying substantial effort in developing requirements based on end user 
needs and feasibility results in a higher quality product. Systems engineering approaches 
provide a project engineer with a standardized process and set of tools for effective 
requirements development for complex systems such as assault aircraft, amphibious 
vehicles, naval ships, and drones. However, this research examined the possible utilization 
of such an approach in other fields that produce essential equipment for the government.     
A. BACKGROUND 
In the 1950s, the government identified the need to store classified material but 
faced an obvious dilemma: how to qualify physical security equipment for use. Two 
options were the government manufacturing its product to meet all safeguarding 
requirements or industry producing equipment with government oversight. The solution 
was determined to be federal specifications, under the control of the General Services 
Administration (GSA), which documented all requirements for physical security 
equipment storing classified information. The first federal specification introduced for this 
purpose was AA-F-357, Filing Cabinet, Steel, Legal and Letter Size Insulated, Security, 
which addressed Executive Order 10501 requirements for storing “official” information. 
The specification detailed protection requirements such as 30 person-minutes against 
surreptitious entry, ten person-minutes against forced entry, 20 person-hours against 
radiological techniques, 1-hour against fire damage to contents, along with other material, 
testing, configuration and usability requirements (General Services Administration 1954). 
Since, GSA has published federal specifications for vault doors, vault systems, information 
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processing system storage, weapons storage, mechanical and electromechanical 
combination locks, pedestrian door lock extensions, and changeable combination padlocks, 
all for securing sensitive national information.  
Product manufacturing process is as follows: manufacturers submit the product to 
meet all requirements listed in the specification for testing, the designated GSA testing 
facility determines whether the product passes or fails based on the specification, and the 
product is included on the qualified products list (QPL) upon passing testing. The 
government can then procure the qualified product from GSA or the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA), which establishes contracts with the manufacturers on the QPL. Another 
key factor in the procurement of physical security equipment is policy and, for this 
research, the Department of Defense (DoD) policy. A policy like DoD Manual 5200.01 
Volume 3, “DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information,” 
mandates the use of storage and locking systems meeting the GSA federal specifications. 
For example, “except as provided elsewhere in this Volume, combination locks on vault 
doors, secure rooms, and security containers protecting classified information shall 
conform to Federal Specification FF-L-2740” (Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) 
2013, 35). Thus, policy requirements may dictate end user (military, government civilians, 
and contractors) needs.  
GSA relies on the Interagency Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE) to 
create, review, update, and provide recommendations on enforcement of all physical 
security equipment federal specifications. This research paper examines the formal process 
for the reviews, tools utilized to document the actions through subject matter expert 
interviews, and how systems engineering can play a role in physical security equipment 
federal specification development. 
B. PROBLEM 
Researchers have defined systems engineering in various ways, but one common 
thread is systems engineering offers “a better and more complete effort regarding the initial 
definition of system requirements, relating these requirements to specific design criteria 
and the follow-on analysis effort to ensure the effectiveness of early decision making in 
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the design process” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 18). The systems engineering 
approach, which has advanced over the decades, can pay major dividends in the creation 
of product requirements that encompass a specification. The approach emphasizes the 
detailed analysis of all elements incorporated in requirement development to ensure 
complete coverage of all stakeholder needs and technical feasibility. From that perspective, 
physical security equipment federal specifications seem like an appropriate platform to 
implement systems engineering processes. Federal specifications must incorporate end 
user, policymaker, manufacturer and testing facility needs, while not limiting design but 
also ensuring enough clarity is present to produce a viable security system. Thus, it is 
common for a specification to undergo many amendments and edition changes. The 
challenge is apparent: how much detail should the government include in the specifications, 
what stakeholders should be involved or considered during development, how are the 
evolving needs of the government accounted for, and what constitutes an effective 
specification?    
C. SCOPE 
The research paper examines four federal specifications recommended by GSA: 
FF-L-2740 “Locks, Combination, Electromechanical,” FF-L-2890 “Lock Extensions 
(Pedestrian Door Lock Assembly Preassembled, Panic and Auxiliary Deadbolt),” FF-P-
110 “Padlock Changeable Combination (Resistant to Opening by Manipulation and 
Surreptitious Attack)” and AA-F-358 “Filing Cabinet, Legal and Letter Size, Uninsulated, 
Security.” After review of available systems engineering methods and tools, the following 
were determined to be optimal for implementation: problem statement identification, 
stakeholder and needs analysis, subject matter expert interviews, operational requirements 
analysis, and functional analysis. This process of analysis is commonly utilized when 
developing requirements for complex systems and applies to equipment development as 
well, especially equipment with the important objective of protecting classified 
information. The designs and functions of specific products on the specification QPLs will 
not be examined in this research, just the expert opinion on the current product available. 
The research will strive to answer the question: Can implementation of systems 
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engineering processes improve current design and performance requirements in physical 
security equipment federal specifications?  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The first step of the process was the identification of the problem statements for 
each specification. The task seems simple, but it is vital to properly identify the appropriate 
problem to ensure the solution meets the true need. A misconstrued problem can lead to a 
product that does not satisfy the government's needs. Then a stakeholder analysis identified 
all interested and affected parties involved with the specification and the needs associated 
with each. Throughout the initial phases of the research, subject matter expert interviews 
provided valuable knowledge on the requirements development process and any current 
issues with the four federal specifications. From there, the completed formulation of 
operational requirements specified the mission definition, performance and physical 
parameters, operational distribution, operational life cycle, utilization requirements, and 
environmental factors (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). The functional analysis completed 
the process detailing exactly what sub-functions should be included in each specification. 
With the data generated, recommendations on possible tools and approaches for future 
specification fabrication were supplied to GSA.  
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II. METHODS 
A. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research conducted for this thesis is unique in the sense that it applies a new 
approach to an established field. The U.S. government has produced physical security 
equipment protecting classified information since 1954 with oversight from GSA. 
However, physical security equipment federal specifications have yet to implement a 
systems engineering approach to develop design and performance requirements. Thus, 
considerable brainstorming and planning were involved in determining the course of 
completion that would yield the most beneficial findings. The execution of the research 
validates if a systems engineering approach applies to physical security equipment 
requirements development, what systems engineering processes best fit such development, 
and if fabrication of standardized tools for future specifications is possible.    
Physical security equipment federal specifications are a hybrid of performance and 
design requirements. The documents detail the physical features, testing, performance, and 
design requirements to obtain GSA approval and are placed on a QPL for procurement 
eligibility by government agencies. As it turns out, requirements development is an 
essential aspect of a systems engineering approach. Throughout the evolution of systems 
engineering, a few varying definitions of the approach have been offered for product 
development—as described by Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011)—which list requirement 
definition as the first action. For example, three of the more iconic models are the Winston 
Royce waterfall model (Figure 1) applied to software systems, Barry Boehm’s risk-driven 
software development spiral model, and the Kevin Forsberg and Harold Mooz “Vee” 
model that links system development with verification. All three models begin with either 
requirements analysis, systems requirements determination, or definition of system 
requirements. The models point to the fact that the definition of needs at the system 
conception level is the commencement for determining end user requirements and 
constructing design criteria (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 38). The requirements for 
physical security equipment delineate the functions that formulate a unified design goal 
and the true problem that is to be resolved by the product. Ensuring that the problem 
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definition reflects the true customer requirements is essential. Optimal requirement 
formulation is an extensive process that implements in-depth analyses that incorporates 
input from all product stakeholders.  
 
Figure 1. Winston Royce Waterfall Model Illustration 
B. PROCEDURE 
The initial action of the research project was to define the intended problem each 
specification addresses. Generating the problem reduces the probability of developing a 
product to a perceived need rather than the actual operational need. From there, a 
stakeholder analysis ensured all parties with interest in the products are considered 
throughout the specification composition. Stakeholder analysis is a process or action 
research methodology used to explore the opinions different stakeholders may have on 
potential outcomes and their influence (Flicker 2014, 713). Physical security equipment 
affects the end users who store the classified material, policymakers concerned with 
effectiveness and feasibility, manufacturers of the product, and the approving agency, to 
name a few. All of these entities examine the federal specifications for different purposes. 
Effective requirements examine all perspectives to avoid missing critical design elements. 
The analysis consists of identifying all stakeholders associated with each specification, 
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ranking the influence and impact on each, and determining the specific need of each. The 
analysis will supply all essential needs the requirements must satisfy. 
The defined needs were then translated into a set of operational requirements. The 
systems engineering and analysis approach formulated the system's operational 
requirements that should be identified early, carefully, and as completely as possible 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 61). For each specification, the following seven factors 
were identified and documented: mission definition, physical and performance parameters, 
operational deployment or distribution, operational life cycle, utilization requirements, 
effectiveness factors, and environmental factors (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). The 
operational requirements act as a guideline for the development of technical performance 
measurements (TPM), the quantitative values that describe system performance. For this 
research project, the TPMs consist of estimated, predicted, and measured quantitative 
values assigned to the operational requirements. As stated in Systems Engineering and 
Analysis, “the objective is to influence the system design process to incorporate the right 
attributes/characteristics to produce a system that will ultimately meet customer 
requirements effectively and efficiently” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 82).        
A critical element throughout the thesis project was the review by subject matter 
experts (SMEs) in the physical security field. The cooperative SMEs were involved with 
the development, reinforcement, testing, or review of all the specifications covered in the 
project in some capacity. Furthermore, the SMEs participated in preliminary interviews 
that established their evaluation of the effectiveness of the specifications, whether the 
current products meeting the specifications were adequate, and any recommended 
specification improvements. The interviews were vital in steering the project in an 
appropriate direction by supplying valuable knowledge of the current specification 
effectiveness and evaluating the validity of the project since the experts have a vast 
knowledge of the specifications.  
The next step in the approach was the functional analysis that translated system 
requirements into detailed design criteria. “The purpose of  ‘functional analysis’ is to 
present an overall integrated description of the system’s functional architecture, and to 
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provide a foundation from which all physical resource requirements are identified” 
(Sadraey 2013, 27). Furthermore, functional analysis ensures all necessary components are 
documented and that no unnecessary components are included in the specifications. The 
analysis broke down all functions related to the specific product from a top-level function 
into sub-level functions. The decomposition of levels depicted by a functional flow block 
diagram continued until it was determined the adequate sub-level was reached, as seen in 
Figure 2. The sub-level functions rendered the attributes each product must have to meet 
the federal specifications. Thus, requirements can be developed and documented based on 
the functions identified in the analysis.  
 
Figure 2. FF-L-2740 Functional Analysis Example 
The research provides lessons learned for implementing future requirement 
developmental procedures for other federal specifications. As stated previously, 
requirements development for specifications based on committee decisions has been quite 
effective. However, a more standardized and thorough approach may lead to time saved, 
9 
reduction in amendments due to more comprehensive initial requirements, and higher 
quality products that completely satisfy the needs of all stakeholders. Supplying the 
government with a comprehensive standardized approach to establishing requirements for 
equipment used to store national classified information was the goal and driving force 
behind this research. 
  
10 
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III. RESULTS 
A systems engineering approach to constructing physical security equipment 
federal specifications has never been executed in the past, which lends no reference to the 
best practice of completion. However, as discussed in the Methods section, the following 
analysis tools were determined to be the most useful for this case: subject matter expert 
interviews, problem statement development, stakeholder/needs analysis, operational 
requirements analysis, and functional analysis of each specification. The analyses are 
typically utilized in the beginning phases of complex systems to fully and accurately define 
the requirements. The results of each analysis provided insight into the need and 
effectiveness of the federal specifications. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT IDENTIFICATION 
A problem statement describes the system capability need in enough qualitative and 
quantitative terms to justifying progressing to the next step (Blanchard and Fabrycky 
2011). For physical security equipment, in particular, the statement must include the 
protection function of the product and what the product is to protect. The problem statement 
must be accurate because it acts as the foundation of the need for product fabrication. Thus, 
if the statement is inaccurate, the product will not satisfy the true need from the field.  
A few components were utilized to piece together the problem statements for each 
specification. First, as the DoD Lock Program subject matter expert, the extensive 
experience on the use of the products through fieldwork over the years has provided much 
insight as to how the current products are utilized and the needs of the end users through 
dialog and observation. Furthermore, review and evaluation of the current specifications 
supplied perspective on the intent of the government regarding the final product desired. 
Lastly, a physical security equipment subject matter expert was consulted for a review of 
the drafted statements. The comments supplied added key elements to each statement. The 
statement must be detailed enough to relay the foundational need without supplying too 
much detail to restrict possible solutions (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011).   
12 
1. Electromechanical Combination Lock 
The first specification examined was the FF-L-2740 Locks, Combination, 
Electromechanical (General Services Administration 2011). An initial view of the need for 
the product can be obtained from the currently implemented government policy. DoD 
policy, in particular, DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3 (Undersecretary of Defense 
(Intelligence) 2013), mandates that all hard copy classified information be stored securely 
using locks meeting FF-L-2740. One can identify that the government requires a deadbolt 
mechanism to store classified information. Remember, the problem statement should not 
contain any detailed performance or design requirements. Therefore, the problem statement 
reads as follows: 
The U.S. government requires a deadbolt mechanism to secure the storage 
component of classified information while unattended. 
Statement elements: 
• The product is to be used by all agencies of the U.S. government and no 
foreign government. 
• The “storage component” is purposefully vague. The secured component 
should not be limited to safes, containers, or any other specific equipment.  
• Specifying a deadbolt is required because no other mechanism shall be 
used to secure the storage component.  
• The material under protection is classified information. 
• The deadbolt is to provide protection when the storage element is 
unattended, meaning it must be capable of being locked and opened only 
by the appropriate personnel. 
2. Pedestrian Door Assembly 
FF-L-2890 Lock Extensions (Pedestrian Door Lock Assembly Preassembled, 
Panic, and Auxiliary Deadbolt) (General Services Administration 2019) is unique in that 
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one event initiated the creation of the specification by identifying new priorities in security. 
The physical security world through the 1990s focused on the integrity of the locking 
systems and the ability to protect an area that may house classified information and arms, 
ammunition, and explosives. However, the tragic occurrence of hijacked airplanes crashing 
into the Twin Towers in 2001 emphasized the need for life safety components in all 
facilities, even those storing classified information. If a physical security product did not 
provide ease of exiting a facility, lives might be lost in an emergency. The government 
supplied guidance that life safety is a priority in all designs. The pedestrian door assemblies 
must secure areas while offering ease of egress. The problem statement for the specification 
is as follows: 
The U.S. government requires a pedestrian door assembly to secure a restricted area 
and incorporate life safety and accessibility components. 
Statement elements: 
• The product is to be used by all agencies of the U.S. government and no 
foreign government. 
• Pedestrian door assemblies characterize the need for locking systems on 
doors in high traffic areas.  
• The door assembly must still only allow access to those granted access, 
which is encompassed by “secure.” 
• “Restricted areas” refer to any areas that restrict access (e.g., Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility [SCIF], Special Access Program 
[SAP]) 
• “Life safety” refers to the ease of exit from the facility, egress, which will 
be defined later. 
• Accessibility refers to the ease of entrance by those physically 
handicapped. 
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3. Combination Padlock 
FF-P-110 Padlock, Changeable Combination (Resistant to Opening by 
Manipulation and Surreptitious Attack) (General Services Administration 1997) is one of 
the oldest specifications that has undergone the least amount of major changes. The need 
derived from the use of classified equipment classified due to the ability of threats to access 
the equipment and gain classified information such as protective distribution systems 
(PDS) boxes that contain wireline and fiber-optics telecommunication systems for 
classified networks. The government determined to ensure forced entry resistance into such 
equipment is not required, as they accept the risk, but the occurrence of a breach into the 
equipment must be evident, entailing manipulation resistance. The problem statement is as 
follows: 
The U.S. government requires a manipulation resistant locking system to secure 
classified equipment in controlled facilities. 
Statement elements: 
• Manipulation resistance protects against undetectable entrance into the 
equipment. Manipulation proof would be infeasible or very costly to 
design. 
• The original statement contained “padlock,” but after review, it was 
determined that the need does not restrict the use of any other locking 
system. Therefore, a locking system is utilized.  
• The equipment will always be located in controlled facilities with layers of 
security surrounding the equipment.  
4. Security Cabinet 
AA-F-358 Filing Cabinet, Legal and Letter Size, Uninsulated, Security (General 
Services Administration 2010) is also an older specification. However, unlike FF-P-110, it 
has undergone significant changes over the years. The need for the product derived from 
Executive Order 10501 by President Eisenhower stating the requirements for safeguarding 
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“official” information (The White House 1953). The government produces an extreme 
number of classified documents through the vast amount of sensitive projects that require 
protection when unattended. It is important to note that within any facility accredited to 
execute classified projects, many different projects can be ongoing in one area, but not all 
personnel may have a need-to-know for all projects. Therefore, securing documents within 
the facility is required instead of the alternative, open storage. With that in mind, the 
problem statement is as follows: 
The U.S. government requires a six-sided container system capable of accepting a 
deadbolt lock to store hard copies of classified information while unattended securely.  
Statement elements: 
• The system must be able to protect from the entrance at every angle that is 
encompassed by a “six-sided container system.”  
• The system must be capable of utilizing a deadbolt to provide access to the 
documents.  
• The system must still only allow access to those granted access, which is 
encompassed by “securely store.” 
• The container is to provide protection when unattended, meaning it must 
be capable of being locked and opened only by authorized personnel. 
5. Summary 
The balance of creating problem statements containing enough information to 
ensure all vital elements of the product were addressed through design without too much 
detail to restrict design was accomplished through multiple iterations and coordination with 
subject matter experts. Through the process, a few lessons learned were gained. For 
example, do not identify a specific locking system into the statement (such as a padlock), 
address all relevant needs with stakeholders, consider feasibility (i.e., manipulation 
resistant vs. manipulation proof) and do not solely rely on products or requirements that 
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already exist because current requirements may not meet the particular need. Table 1 shows 
the finalized problem statements. 
Table 1. Finalized Problem Statements 
Federal 
Specification Problem Statement 
FF-L-2740 
The U.S. Government requires a deadbolt mechanism to secure the 
storage component of hard copy classified information while 
unattended. 
FF-L-2890 
The U.S. Government requires a pedestrian door assembly to secure 
a restricted area and incorporate life safety and accessibility 
components. 
FF-P-110 The U.S. Government requires a manipulation resistant locking system to secure classified equipment in controlled facilities. 
AA-F-358 
The U.S. Government requires a six-sided container system capable 
of accepting a deadbolt lock to store hard copies of classified 
information while unattended securely.  
 
B. STAKEHOLDER AND NEEDS ANALYSIS 
Physical security equipment federal specifications affect many organizations and 
individuals to varying degrees ranging from the DoD policy authorities to manufacturers, 
and government end users to commercial locksmiths. All parties influenced or impacted 
by the specifications are considered stakeholders for this research. The argument could be 
made the stakeholders are the most important element of the requirements because it is 
their needs that must be satisfied. To effectively prioritize all needs, every stakeholder must 
be identified, and their need accurately documented, and quantify the influence and impact 
of each while accurately documenting each stakeholder need (Blanchard and Fabrycky 
2011). The tasks seem rudimentary, but human factors are always involved. The 
stakeholder must provide the need, but the responsibility falls on the entity fabricating the 
specification, in this case, GSA. This research executed the stakeholder analysis using my 
experience gained from years on the IACSE committee as well as input from other subject 
matter experts. 
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1. Stakeholder Analysis 
The first step of a stakeholder analysis is to identify all stakeholders involved in the 
system, or this case, involved in the specification requirements development process. The 
identification process examined key elements to product development, manufacturing, and 
support such as: who influences policy for the physical security equipment, who delivers 
the initial need, who produces the equipment, who supports the equipment approval, who 
supplies training, and who supplies ongoing field support? These considerations resulted 
in four categories that encompass all of the stakeholders detailed in Table 2.    
Table 2. Federal Specification Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Category Stakeholder 
End user 
Department of Defense (DoD), Department of 
Energy (DoE), State Department, Department of 
Justice (DoJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), Government 
Contractors, Non-Title 50 Agencies, National 
Intelligence Community (NIC) 
Program Support Agencies 
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), 
Defense Security Service (DSS), Interagency 
Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE), 
General Services Administration (GSA), DoD Lock 
Program Field Support, DoD Lock Program 
Testing Facility, GSA Certified Technicians & 
Inspectors 
GSA Approved Training Lockmasters Security Institute, MBA USA, Inc. 
Container/Lock/Vault Door/Accessory 
Manufacturers 
Container Manufacturers, Lock Manufacturers, 





The stakeholder analysis identified the influence and impact each has on the 
specification (ranked by low, medium, or high). Utilizing the respective levels of impact 
and influence, the stakeholders were plotted on an Influence (Power) and Interest Grid for 
Stakeholder Prioritization (Thompson n.d.), Figure 3. The grid categorizes the data points 
into four quadrants based on the rankings. The grid assisted with recognizing to what 
degree the stakeholders shall be included in the requirements development process 
spanning from manage closely (keeping engaged and ensuring needs are satisfied) to 
monitor (kept updated but no significant effort required). The grid and categories were: 
 
Figure 3. Power/Interest Grid for Stakeholder Prioritization. Source: 
Thompson (n.d.). 
• Manage Closely (high influence, high interest): must fully engage and 
expend significant effort to satisfy. 
• Keep Satisfied (high influence, low interest): keep updated but do not over 
communicate. 
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• Keep Informed (low influence, high interest): adequately inform and 
ensure no issues arise with these stakeholders. 
• Monitor (low influence, low interest): monitor needs, but not too much 
communication is required. 
The categorization of stakeholders required criteria to assess whether the 
stakeholder’s interest and influence in the federal specification were low, medium, or high. 
The criteria was developed with the consultation of GSA and subject matter experts (see 
Table 3) and with considerations that included the amount invested in the particular 
physical security equipment, the level of involvement in the requirements development 
process, and the percentage of labor hours or business invested in support of the equipment.  
Table 3. Stakeholder Analysis Criteria 
Grading Criteria Low Medium High 
End user - - - 
Impact 
Invests less than $1 




Invests $1 to $5 million 
annually in product 
meeting specification 
($100K - $500K for FF-P-
110J) 
Invests more than 
$5 million annually 
in product meeting 
specification (more 
than $500k for FF-P-
100J)  
Influence 
Rare participant in 
specification 
fabrication 
Occasional participant in 
specification fabrication 








accounts for 15% or 
less of labor hours 
GSA-approved product 
support accounts for 
15%-50% of labor hours 
GSA-approved 
product support 
accounts for more 

















Grading Criteria Low Medium High 
GSA Approved 
Training Centers - - - 
Impact 
Accounts for 15% or 
less of training 
offered 
Accounts for 15%-50% 
of training offered 
Accounts for more 
than 50% of the 
training offered 
Influence 




end user feedback, 
recommendations 
Consistently 







- - - 
Impact 
Product accounts for 
15% or less of 
company profits 
Product accounts for 
15%-50% of company 
profits 
Product accounts 
for more than 50% 

















The analysis results were consistent across all four specifications with the 
exemption of one case (recognized the National Intelligence Community “monitor” in FF-
P-110 but as “monitor closely” in the other three specifications). Figure 4 depicts the results 
of the analysis is graphical form encompassing all four specifications. The results in tabular 
and graphical form for each specification are located in Appendix A.  
21 
 
Figure 4. Stakeholder Prioritization Grid for all Specifications. 
Adapted from Thompson (n.d.). 
a. Summary 
The analysis examined all stakeholders with interest or influence in the 
specification to determine the level of communication that should be established for each. 
The categorization of each organization provided GSA with an idea of how to fabricate the 
communications plan for each specification. The analysis found that throughout each 
specification, the resulting category for each stakeholder remained the same. Table 4 
details the cumulative results. Note: no stakeholder was identified in the Keep Satisfied 
category because all stakeholders that have high to moderate power tended to have high 
interest.  
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Table 4. Categorized Stakeholder Chart 
Communications Category Stakeholders 
Manage Closely 
• IACSE 




• State Department 
• NSA 
• Field Support/Testing Facility 
• Container Manufacturer 




• NRO  
• Training Center 




• DOE  
• DOJ 
• Accessory Manufacturers 
 
2. Needs Analysis 
The objective of the needs analysis was to detail each stakeholder need to ensure 
inclusion in the requirements development. If one entity were left out, important 
requirements impacting that element of the specification could go unaddressed, leading to 
amendments or an ineffective product. The accuracy of the needs analysis is very 
significant, and as the tables will show, each stakeholder need varies. The needs for a 
particular stakeholder was the same throughout the four specifications due to the similarity 
in product capabilities. Therefore, Table 5 incorporates the needs for all specifications.  
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Table 5. Stakeholder Needs Analysis Results 
Stakeholder Needs 
End user 
Department of Defense, 
Department of Energy, 
State Department, 
Department of Justice, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
National Security Agency, 
National Reconnaissance Office, 
Department of Homeland Security, 
Government Contractors, 
Non-Title 50 Agencies, 
National Intelligence Community 
Protection of classified information and 
secured areas, user-friendly product 
(usability, reliability), clear requirements 
Program Support Agencies 
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) 
Feasible and clear requirements, meets 
ISOO intent, delivers reliable product 
Defense Security Service 
Secure storage of classified information, 
user-friendly product (usability, 
movability, reliability), clear 
requirements 
Interagency Advisory Committee on Security 
Equipment (IACSE) 
Ensure end user needs are met, intent 
reflected in requirements, secure storage 
of classified information 
General Services Administration 
Responsible for specification, user-
friendly product (usability, reliability), 
protection of classified information 
DoD Lock Program Field Support 
Viable procedures available, clear 
requirements 
DoD Lock Program Testing Facility 
Clear performance, design and testing 
requirements, feasible requirements, 
clear submittal requirements 





Clear performance, design and testing requirements, 
feasible requirements, clear submittal requirements, 
specialized testing 
Defense Logistics Agency Viable procedures available, clear requirements 
GSA Approved Training Centers 
Lockmasters Security Institute, 
MBA USA, Inc. 




Sargent and Greenleaf 
Clear performance, design requirements, feasible 
requirements, rapid access to updates, 
profitable/market 
Container Manufacturers 
Alpha Safe and Vault, Inc., 
Hamilton Products Group, Inc., 
Will-Burt Company, 
A&H Security Cabinets, Inc., 
American Made Safe & Security, LLC. 
Clear performance, design requirements, feasible 
requirements, rapid access to updates 
 
Vault Door Manufacturers 
Will-Burt Company, 
Overly Manufacturing Co., 
Hamilton Products Group, Inc., 
International Vault, Inc., 
Brown Safe Manufacturing 
Clear performance, design requirements, feasible 




Clear performance, design requirements, feasible 
requirements, rapid access to updates 
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C. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
The physical security community relies heavily on the guidance of experts in the 
field when deriving new specifications, making recommendations on policy, or evaluating 
proposed needs. Those involved with federal specifications for more than 20 years can 
provide valuable insight into not only how requirements have been developed but also have 
a historical perspective on how decisions were made. The accumulated knowledge base of 
these experts is more valuable than any documentation available because they know the 
circumstances surrounding the determination of needs and requirements. For example, it is 
not documented that the events of September 11th contributed to the reinforcement of 
federal specification FF-L-2890 due to life safety concerns, but experts readily supply that 
information, “Then you add in in the life safety issues post 911 becomes very complicated. 
I say that because a lot of people don’t realize that 911 and what went on in those towers 
significantly impacted the life safety requirements in the United States requirements,” as 
claimed by Participant 5 (retired physical security specialist) in the discussion, July 21, 
2019. Thus, expert insight on the subject of this research is extremely beneficial.  
Five experts in the field of physical security equipment were asked to participate in 
interviews, all of which are members of IACSE. The selectees were chosen for the current 
role in federal specification development and the experience with physical security 
equipment. For this paper to conform to IRB protocols, names will not be associated with 
the results. Instead, the individuals are identified as “Participant” 1 through 5. Participants 
1 through 4 were interviewed in person, and Participant 5 was interviewed over the phone. 
Each conversation was recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions were exported into the 
qualitative analysis tool, QDA Miner Lite, to establish patterns and assist with 
interpretation of the data provided by experts. The software was selected due to its ability 
to code text and analyze the code frequency among all transcripts. The interview questions 
are listed in Appendix B.  
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1. Participant Description 
A brief description of each participant provides insight into the knowledge base 
incorporated in the supplied responses. The participants were selected based on their vast 
experience in the field and the different perspectives they offer.  
• Participant 1: Involved with physical security at the field operator level 
during Naval career from 1982 through 2004 from which retired to join 
the DoD Lock Program as a team lead and manager. Currently fills a 
prominent role in the IACSE. 
• Participant 2: A member of the DoD Lock Program for eighteen years and 
involved with reviewing, developing, interpreting, and implementing 
specifications. Currently an active IACSE committee member. 
• Participant 3: A member of the GSA-approved testing facility for ten years 
where he has tested numerous products to the federal specifications for 
approval. Currently an active IACSE committee member. 
• Participant 4: Involved in the development and testing of the physical 
security equipment for 20 years as a GSA employee. Currently fills a 
prominent role in the IACSE. 
• Participant 5: Involved with physical security for over 40 years, having 
direct involvement with federal specifications for 25 years. An active 
IACSE committee member and currently the primary specification drafter.  
2. Qualitative Data Analysis 
The qualitative analysis executed for this research paper consisted of coding all 
relevant topics present in the cases, establishing the coding frequency, then analyzing the 
significance of the codes. “Coding” refers to the grouping or labeling of commentary into 
subgroups, and “cases” are the individual interviews imported into the software. The 
analysis can be categorized as “content analysis” because it classifies and summarizes the 
comments documented from the interviews. The difficult aspect of the analysis was 
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determining how to categorize the results in a manner that would identify themes across 
interviews. However, a deep examination of the data revealed relations consistent with all 
the codes.  
The codes embodied four high-level categories that related lifecycle stages with 
subject matter expert observations: Development, Evaluation, Deficiencies, and 
Improvements. All the codes present in every case linked to the four recognized categories. 
For example, one high-level code was identified as Development for codes related to the 
characteristics and causes for specification development with sublevels: Events, Federal 
Specification Manual, IACSE Review, Manufacturers Offer New Product, New Need, No 
Submissions, Unknown Procedure, Policy, and Sustained Development. The “Analyze” 
function of the software supplied a “Code Frequency” output that tallied the code mentions 
in a tabular format. The tools provided in Table 8 detailing the “Category,” “Code,” 
“Description,” “Count,” and “Cases.” The results of codes mentioned at least twice in two 
separate interviews are listed in Appendix B. The eight most mentioned codes are listed 
with descriptions below (minimum of five counts and four cases).  
• Code: Clarity; Category: Evaluation; Count: 15; Cases: 5  
Description: Subject matter experts emphasized the importance of 
specifications to be written clearly to ensure the intended interpretation 
from all stakeholders involved. For example, end users rely on the 
specification to develop policy for appropriate use of the security 
equipment, while manufacturers rely on the requirements for accurate 
product development.  
• Code: Changing Needs; Category: Evaluation; Count: 13; Cases: 4 
Description: Experts detailed the importance of monitoring changes in end 
user needs, which has led to past federal specification amendments and 
revisions. Needs naturally evolve due to technological advancements, 
policy alterations or tactical developments, which must be incorporated in 
physical security equipment requirements.  
• Code: Need Met; Category: Evaluation; Count: 10; Cases: 4  
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Description: Experts highlighted the satisfaction of stakeholders' needs as 
one of the main objectives of the federal specifications. Talking points 
included meeting policy, end user, manufacturer, and technician needs to 
ensure the product is effectively implemented to protect classified 
information.  
• Code: Sustained Development; Category: Development; Count: 8;   
Cases: 4   
Description: Experts mentioned that not only is the initial development of 
federal specifications important to produce valid equipment but also the 
sustained development of requirements. Requirements must be continually 
reviewed and evaluated for effectiveness in current applications.    
• Code: New Need; Category: Development; Count: 6; Cases: 5 
Description: The identification of a new stakeholder need was identified as 
a major factor for amendment or revision initiation. Currently, new needs 
are informally introduced to the IACSE committee for review.  
• Code: NSA Lock Need; Category: Deficiencies; Count: 6; Cases: 3 
Description: Three experts mentioned the current situation with NSA 
introducing a capabilities gap in what is required in the field versus what 
the FF-P-110 offers to the IACSE. All experts stated not enough 
requirements have been supplied to the IACSE to move forward with 
revisions to current specifications.  
• Code: Classified Testing; Category: Improvements; Count: 6; Cases: 2 
Description: Two experts commented on the benefits of a supplemental 
classified testing procedure for surreptitious, covert, and forced entry tests. 
To avoid entry methods falling into the wrong hands, the supplement must 
be classified at the appropriate level. The testing procedure will allow for 
technique development and ensure each article is tested to the same 
standards. 
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• Code: Needs Analysis; Category: Improvements; Count: 5; Cases: 4 
Description: All but one expert mentioned how a formalized needs analysis 
would assist the program in identifying needs, validating viability, and 
determining a path forward. Currently, there is not a formalized analysis 
established by the IACSE.  
• Code: Technique Change; Category: Development; Count: 5; Cases: 4 
Description: Testing and attack techniques naturally evolve with the 
availability of new tools and methods. Four experts mentioned the 
importance of the specifications and committee to stay up to date in these 
areas.  
D. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
The problem statements, stakeholder identification, needs analysis, and data 
gathered from the subject matter experts established the necessary foundation for the 
operational requirements analysis. The Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) approach was 
implemented for this research to assist with the complete inclusion of all vital elements. 
This called for the identification of seven operational factors: mission definition, physical 
and performance parameters, operational deployment or distribution, operational life cycle, 
utilization requirements, effectiveness factors, and environmental factors. The process of 
developing the factors incorporated review of each specification, analysis of end user needs 
through observation and inquiry, and calibration with subject matter experts due to the 
importance of high-level accuracy for the results. Operational requirements were the basis 
for the functional analysis conducted later which will establish the requirements 
documented in the final specifications. If the requirements analysis were incomplete or 
inaccurate, the resulting system would have a high probability of not meeting end user 
needs.  
Therefore, it is essential to include consideration of operational requirements at a 
great depth and to do so early in the system life cycle when the specification of such 
requirements has the greatest impact on the design. The questions to answer for each 
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operational factor as stated in the Systems Engineering and Analysis textbook are as 
follows:  
• Mission definition: Identification of the prime and alternate or secondary 
missions of the system. What is the system to accomplish? How will the 
system accomplish its objectives? The mission may be defined through 
one or a set of scenarios or operational profiles. The dynamics of system 
operating conditions must be identified to the extent possible. 
• Performance and physical parameters: Definition of the operating 
characteristics or functions of the system (e.g., size, weight, speed, range, 
accuracy, flow rate, capacity, transmit, receive, throughput, etc.). What 
are the critical system performance parameters? How are they related to 
the mission scenario? 
• Operational deployment or distribution: Identification of the quantity of 
the equipment, software, personnel, facilities, and so on and the expected 
geographical location to include transportation and mobility 
requirements. How much equipment and associated software is to be 
distributed, and where is it to be located, and for how long? When does 
the system become fully operational? 
• Operational life cycle (horizon): Anticipated time that the system will be 
in operational use (expected period of sustainment). What is the total 
inventory profile throughout the system life cycle? Who will be 
operating the system, and for what time? 
• Utilization requirements: Anticipated usage of the system and its 
elements (e.g., hours of operation per day, percentage of total capacity, 
operational cycles per month, facility loading). How is the system to be 
used by the customer, operator, or operating authority in the field? 
• Effectiveness factors: System requirements specified as figures-of-merit 
(FOMs) such as cost/system effectiveness, operational availability (Ao), 
readiness rate, dependability, logistic support effectiveness, mean time 
between maintenance (MTBM), failure rate (λ), maintenance downtime 
(MDT), facility utilization (in percent), operator skill levels and task 
accomplishment requirements, and personnel efficiency. Given that the 
system will perform, how effective or efficient is it? How are these 
factors related to the mission scenario? 
• Environmental factors: Definition of the environment in which the 
system is expected to operate (e.g., temperature, humidity, artic or 
tropics, mountainous or flat terrain, airborne, ground, or shipboard). This 
should include a range of values as applicable and should cover all 
transportation, handling, and storage modes. How will the system be 
handled in transit? To what will the system be subjected during its 
operational use, and for how long? A complete environmental profile 
should be developed. (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 61) 
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The analysis results for each specification are described in the following sections. 
Each section underwent multiple iterations to reach the final product. The objective was to 
complete the analysis using the program manager’s perspective to evaluate how effective 
the tool could be.  
1. Electromechanical Combination Lock 
• Mission definition: The lock shall secure classified material using a hand-
operated deadbolt mechanism installed on security containers and 
pedestrian doors. The lock must require an established combination to 
retract the bolt. 
• Physical and performance parameters: The lock must incorporate a self or 
battery-powered display, or graduated dial enabling manual bolt retraction 
with a minimum of 1,000,000 different combinations and dual 
combination capabilities. The locking system must resist 20 man-hours of 
manipulation and radiological attack, 30 man-minutes of covert entry, and 
20 man-hours of surreptitious entry. The lock body must fit the “magic 
module footprint” (3.343” x 2.397”) with specified mounting hole 
diameter and locations.    
• Operational deployment or distribution: The locks shall be located on 
assets securing classified information (i.e., security containers and doors to 
open storage areas). Product meeting the specification will be shipped all 
over the world and used by the government and its contractors CONUS 
and OCONUS. 
• Operational life cycle: Locks must operate for 10,000 cycles (based on 20-
year use operated twice daily).  
• Utilization requirements: The locks will secure containers or facilities 
when unattended with unlimited use during daily operations and used by 
personnel with basic operation knowledge. 
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• Effectiveness factors: The locks shall require no more than annual 
maintenance, have a failure rate of less than 10% during testing, require no 
more than a two-day training course to certify personnel on maintenance, 
repair, and installation of the product, and be operable by personnel with 
limited experience based on provided instructions. 
• Environmental factors: Locks shall operate in primarily habitable indoor 
conditions but also limited outdoor conditions exposed to high and low 
temperatures, salt spray, moisture, UV rays, debris, and shock over a 20-
year life cycle.  
2. Pedestrian Door Assembly 
• Mission definition: The pedestrian door lock extension must provide 
single egress with configurations including capabilities of housing a magic 
module footprint deadbolt, lock integrating with existing facility access 
control, incorporating built-in access control, providing secondary door 
access (no lock meeting FF-L-2740) and incorporating permanently 
deadbolt exit only egress.  
• Physical and performance parameters:  The lock extensions must be 
American Disabilities Act (ADA), Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), 
Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), International Build 
Code (IBC), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and 
International Fire Code (IFC) compliant and resist 20 man-hours of 
surreptitious entry. 
• Operational life cycle: Lock extensions must operate for 500,000 cycles 
without replacement of any component. 
• Utilization requirements: The lock extensions will secure facilities when 
unattended with unlimited use during daily operations and used by 
personnel with basic operation knowledge. 
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• Effectiveness factors: The lock extensions shall require no more than 
annual maintenance, have a failure rate of less than 10% during testing, 
require no more than a two-day training course to certify personnel on 
maintenance, repair, and installation of the product, and be operable by 
personnel with limited experience based on provided instructions. 
• Environmental factors: Locks shall operate in primarily habitable indoor 
conditions but also limited outdoor conditions exposed to high and low 
temperatures, salt spray, moisture, UV rays, debris, and shock over a 20-
year life cycle. 
3. Combination Padlock 
• Mission definition: The padlock must secure with a shackle and grant 
access only with an appropriate combination.  
• Physical and performance parameters: The padlock must have a minimum 
of 30,000 different combinations, a ¼-dial number dialing tolerance, at 
least three combination wheels and cam. “The outside dimensions across 
the shackle shall be of 1.5 inches ±0.125-inch (38.1 millimeters (mm) 
±3.175 mm), and the space under the shackle shall be of sufficient size to 
fasten around a 0.75-inch (19.05 mm) diameter bar. The diameter of the 
shackle shall be 0.31-inch -0.00, +0.02-inch (7.938 mm -0.00, +0.55 mm). 
The length of the padlock, when locked, shall be 4.375 inches (111.125 
mm) maximum. The width or thickness shall not exceed 2.75 inches 
(69.85 mm)” (General Services Administration 1997, 5). 
• Operational life cycle: Padlock must operate for 5,000 cycles without 
replacement of any component. 
• Utilization requirements: The padlock will secure classified equipment 
when unattended with unlimited use during daily operations and used by 
personnel with basic operation knowledge. 
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• Effective factors: The locks shall require no more than annual 
maintenance, have a failure rate of less than 10% during testing, require no 
more than a one-day training course to certify personnel on maintenance, 
repair,, and installation of the product, and be operable by personnel with 
limited experience based on provided instructions. 
• Environmental factors: Locks shall operate in primarily habitable indoor 
conditions but also limited outdoor conditions exposed to high and low 
temperatures and moisture over a 20-year life cycle.  
4. Security Cabinet 
• Mission definition: The six-sided cabinet shall secure classified material 
by utilizing a combination lock meeting with the magic module footprint. 
Depending on the configuration, the cabinet is to protect hard copy 
classified documents, weapons, or other classified material with 
dimensions that will enable storage.  
• Physical and performance parameters: The cabinets must resist “20 man-
hours surreptitious entry, 30 man-minutes covert entry, and ten man-
minutes forced entry” (General Services Administration 2010, 1) (forced 
entry requirements only for Class 5). The required configurations include 
those with multiple control drawers (drawers mounted with lock), single 
control drawer, styles with varying sizes, and capable of storing weapons 
and being mounted. 
• Operational life cycle: Cabinet must operate for 50,000 cycles without 
replacement of any component. 
• Utilization requirements: The cabinet will secure classified material when 
unattended with unlimited use during daily operations and used by 
personnel with basic operation knowledge. 
35 
• Effective factors: The cabinet shall require no more than annual 
maintenance, have a failure rate of less than 10% during testing, require no 
more than a one-day training course to certify personnel on maintenance, 
repair, and installation of the product, and capable of being operated by 
personnel with limited experience based on provided instructions. 
• Environmental factors: Cabinets shall operate in primarily habitable 
indoor conditions but also limited outdoor conditions for particular 
mountable configurations exposed to shock and vibration. 
5. Summary 
The analysis examines the precise needs by assigning quantitative values, which 
allows for confirmation by end users and serves as a feasibility check. The quantitative 
data is essential for the development of general operational requirements to be further 
decomposed via the functional analysis. The following functional analysis will include all 
operational requirements while ensuring the inclusion of an adequate decomposition of 
sub-levels.  
E. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Functional analysis decomposes the top-level function of a system or in this case, 
physical security equipment, into all the required sub-level functions in detail. The sub-
level functions provide the last piece in the requirements development process as needs 
were boiled down from general problem statements to function diagrams addressing each 
functional component. The analysis was completed with the operational requirements as 
the baseline and utilized the review of security experts. The current specifications were 
referenced, but not relied on for descriptions of all functions as an examination of the 
equipment's physical requirements went beyond what is currently available. For each 
specification, the top-level functions were decomposed until it was determined an adequate 
sub-level was reached using a hierarchy diagram. The function diagrams were composed 
on Innoslate, a systems engineering tool supporting the integration of requirements analysis 
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and management, functional analysis and allocation, solution synthesis, test/evaluation, 
and simulation (Innoslate 2017).  
Functions refer “to a specific or discrete action that is necessary to achieve a given 
objective” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 86). Thus, the specific detailed requirements 
addressing the values associated with the functions are derived from the function 
hierarchical diagram. For example, “withstand exposure to high temperatures” is the 
function the product must execute. However, the requirement the system is to execute 
associated with the function could be “The lock shall operate in a temperature range of -
10ºF to 158ºF (-23.3ºC to 70.0ºC). Locks shall be tested for compliance with this 
requirement in accordance with 4.6.10” (GSA 2011). The analysis assists program 
management in identifying all the functional needs of the system, which are then correlated 
to requirements based on an existing policy, product specifications, anticipated system 
environment, and other factors. The next sections will present the functional analysis 
results of the four specifications in the tabular format. Appendix A includes the hierarchy 
charts. 
1. Electromechanical Combination Lock 
Below are the results of the FF-L-2740 Locks, Combination, Electromechanical 
functional analysis. The functional hierarchy diagram can be found in Appendix C. 
Table 6. FF-L-2740 Functional Analysis Results 
Prime Function 1st Level 2nd Level 3rd Level 
0.0 Prevent 
unauthorized 
access to security 
containers and 
doors 
1.0 Secure with 
deadbolt 
1.1 Fit all 
applications 






1.2.1 Mount to all 
applications 
adequately 





2.1.1 Expose to a 
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2.2.1 Expose to a 
determined level of 
electrostatic charge 










material in the 
allotted time 
2.4 Delay covert 
entry 





material in the 
allotted time 
2.5 Retract bolt 
only with the 
correct input 
2.5.1 Enable 
storage of a 
determined 
amount of codes 
2.5.2 Enable 
change of 











3.1.2 Ensure secure 

































salt spray and 
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4.3 Continue 
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supplied by the 
manufacturer) 
 
2. Pedestrian Door Assembly 
Below are the results of the FF-L-2890 Lock Extension (Pedestrians Door Lock 
Assembly Preassembled, Panic, and Auxiliary Deadbolt) functional analysis. The 
functional hierarchy diagram can be found in Appendix C. 
Table 7. FF-L-2890 Functional Analysis Results 
Prime Function 1st Level 2nd Level 3rd Level 
0.0 Delay 
unauthorized 
access to a secure 
area 
1.0 Provide single 
egress and access 
1.1 Allow for single-
hand egress 
1.1.1 Comply with 
all applicable codes 
1.2 Allow for single-
hand access 
1.2.1 Comply with 
all applicable codes 
2.0 Secure with 
pedestrian door 
2.1 Configure with 
building access 
control for day use 
2.1.1 Allow the 
extension to open 
with credentials 
2.1.2 Compatible 
with access control 
2.1.3 Secure with 
deadbolt retracted 
and no credential 
input 







Prime Function 1st Level 2nd Level 3rd Level 
2.2.2 Interface with 
the door assembly 
2.2.3 FF-L-2740 
included in the 
deliverable 
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supplied by the 
manufacturer) 
 
3. Combination Padlock 
Below are the results of the FF-P-110 Padlock, Changeable Combination 
(Resistant to Opening by Manipulation and Surreptitious Attack) functional analysis. The 
functional hierarchy diagram can be found in Appendix C. 
Table 8. FF-P-110 Functional analysis results 
Prime Function 1st Level 2nd Level 3rd Level 
0.0 Prevent 
unauthorized 
access to classified 
equipment 
1.0 Secure with 
shackle 
1.1 Physically fit 
desired 
applications 
1.1.1 Fit through 
hasp being secured 
1.1.2 Fit around 
hasp being secured 





2.1.1 Expose to a 













Prime Function 1st Level 2nd Level 3rd Level 
2.2.2 Delay 










unlatching of the 
shackle 
2.4 Unlatch shackle 
only with access 
2.4.1 Enable 
storage of a 
determined 
amount of codes 
2.4.2 Enable 
change of code 















exposure to high 
temperature 













4.1.1 Operate after 
determined cycles 
4.2 Operate with 
limited 
maintenance 
4.2.1 Operate after 
determined cycles 
4.3 Operate only 
utilizing 
instructions 
4.3.1 Operate and 
install by personnel 
with no formal 
training 
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4. Security Cabinet 
Below are the results of the AA-F-358 Filing Cabinet, Legal and Letter Size, 
Uninsulated functional analysis. The functional hierarchy diagram can be found in 
Appendix C. 
Table 9. AA-F-358 Functional Analysis Results 
Prime Function 1st level 2nd level 3rd level 
0.0 Prevent 
unauthorized 




1.1 Store classified 
material 
1.1.1 Allow access to 
material with 
deadbolt retracted 
1.1.2 Provide space 
for classified 
documents 
1.1.3 Allow for 
compartmentalized 
storage 






mechanism to meet 
FF-L-2740 
1.2.3 FF-L-2740 
included in the 
deliverable 
2.0 Delay physical 
manipulation 
2.1 Delay forced 
entry (Class 5) 
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2.3 Delay covert 
entry 

























incurred shock and 









4.1.1 Operate after 
determined cycles 
4.2 Operate with 
limited 
maintenance 
4.2.1 Operate after 
determined cycles 
4.3 Operate only 
utilizing 
instructions 
4.3.1 Operate and 
install by personnel 




The systems engineering analyses implemented in this section provide a detailed 
incremental approach to developing requirements for complex systems. However, the tools 
correlate well to specification requirements development. The executed analyses ensured 
examination of specification problem statements, identification and ranking of all 
stakeholders and needs, the inclusion of subject matter expert inputs, the examination of 
operational requirements, and development of function hierarchy chart. The functional 
analysis provides the responsible party the necessary foundation to develop requirements 
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for specification input. The results demonstrate a systems engineering approach can be 
implemented with physical security federal specifications, which were only an assumption 
prior. The next section discusses the value and possible future use of the systematic 
approach outlined in this research with physical security equipment specifications.  
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IV. DISCUSSION 
GSA has published 14 federal specifications that have delivered physical security 
equipment currently used to secure national classified information and arms, ammunition, 
and explosives (AA&E).  However, all specifications administer amendments, with some 
experiencing up to ten complete revisions. Subject matter expert interviews revealed that 
the cause of specification updates are due to stakeholder need changes, lack of complete 
understanding of stakeholder needs or misguided system function identification. GSA 
implements a “feature-based approach” to specification development that can be 
characterized as informal brainstorming lists of requirements. While subject matter experts 
complete the brainstorming sessions via the IACSE Committee, the execution is not 
standardized nor documented. “The feature-based approach enables developers to quickly 
elicit and collect requirements inputs with a minimal effort” (Wasson 2005, 344). However, 
as stated in the textbook System Analysis, Design and Development, the approach is prone 
to resulting in “missing, misplaced, conflicting or contradictory and duplicated 
requirements”, which is consistent with the number of specification revisions (Wasson 
2005, 343).  
These analyses intend to demonstrate an improvement in physical security 
equipment specification requirements development through the implementation of a 
systems engineering approach. A definitive indication of such an improvement was the 
identification of requirements missing from current specifications. Due to a lack of 
resources, the research could not complete the necessary analysis to detail all required 
specifications. The research could not obtain complete involvement from stakeholders such 
as the manufacturers, GSA, the IACSE committee or the DoD Lock Program because 
funding is not allocated for such an effort. Thus, no insight from manufacturers, detailed 
analysis from IACSE, or access to testing procedures was included in the research. 
However, a particular value of the approach was evident. Although all existing 
requirements could not be validated, the approach offers tools that will lead to fewer 
amendments and improved documentation if adopted in the current process. This section 
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will illustrate how each tool supplies value to the development process and what future 
actions from GSA can take to improve the current process. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem statement identification ensures the program manager truly 
understands the reason for the design of a system acting as the solution. Lessons learned 
were discovered during the construction of the statements for each specification. We 
realized that the tendency to add too much detail to the statement could restrict the design 
of the system. For example, stating a system “must prevent physical manipulation” implies 
an absolute condition that may not be feasible. “Prevent” implies the system shall not allow 
physical manipulation at all, no matter the duration. In reality, there are security measures 
set in place that resist identified threats within a certain period so the correct nomenclature 
is “delay” in this case. Also, existing specifications cannot be solely relied on to recognize 
the problem. This initial action in the approach is vital because a system cannot satisfy end 
user needs when it solves an inaccurate problem. 
B. STAKEHOLDER AND NEEDS ANALYSIS 
The stakeholder analysis provides a means of documenting and prioritizing all 
parties which impact and influence the system. Currently, members of the IACSE have the 
experience and history of knowing how each stakeholder affects the requirements 
development process, but there is no formalized approach or plan for coordination. The 
stakeholder analysis ranked the groups into the categories manage closely, keep satisfied, 
keep informed and monitor which allows GSA to consider communication strategies. The 
results of the analysis were expected based on the current inclusion of stakeholders in the 
decision processes. However, one entity in the manage closely category is not engaged to 
the appropriate degree. The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) is responsible 
for disseminating policy on the procurement of physical security equipment and impacts 
the specifications by dictating the use of certain products. For example, ISOO Notice 2014-
02 states GSA-approved security containers and vault doors must be procured through the 
GSA supply center rather than directly from container manufacturers (ISOO 2014). The 
analysis showed the stakeholder is one of the most impactful and influential parties but 
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does not have an active role in the IACSE. Thus, ISOO is not consistently informed of the 
committee decisions and the thought process behind the decisions. Based on the findings 
of the analysis, the composition of a communication plan is suggested for GSA to 
document the detailed actions of inclusion for all stakeholders. GSA could use the provided 
analysis as a baseline for development.  
The needs analysis detailed the general needs of each stakeholder recognized to 
have an impact and/or influence over the federal specifications. However, due to time and 
resource constraints, the analysis did not include input from each entity. Consequently, the 
results are based solely on experience within the IASCE and collaboration with subject 
matter experts. A more inclusive analysis may render information directly from 
stakeholders that have not yet been considered. For example, manufacturers may offer 
suggestions on how to detail requirements that do not limit the possibilities of viable 
configurations. Other inputs not present in the research include end user, installer, training 
facility, testing facility, and field support perspectives on the adequacy and effectiveness 
of current federal specifications. Thus, it is recommended that GSA conduct a needs 
analysis for each specification to further detail considerations for future specifications 
resulting in a complete document. However, out of all the recommendations, the needs 
analysis for every stakeholder is the least vital because GSA has a considerably accurate 
view of each need with the immense experience gained from past interactions.  
C. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
The subject matter expert interviews were particularly valuable. The strategic 
selection of interviewees offered a range of perspectives resulting in a complete description 
of the specification development process and what may be missing. Consistencies amongst 
the five interviews were apparent, but each also offered unique insight on how the 
requirement development process could be improved. The qualitative data analysis 
categorized the transcript codes into four themes: Development, Evaluation, Deficiencies, 
and Improvements. The top five codes identified, Clarity (15), Changing Needs (13), Need 
Met (10), Sustained Development (8), and New Needs (6), represent the reflections of the 
evaluation and development process of the specifications. The importance of clear 
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requirements, addressing changing, and newly discovered needs, fully satisfying end user 
needs and continually developing requirements were reflected in all of the interviews.  
The high-volume mention of clarity is not surprising due to the number of varying 
stakeholders that rely on the specifications. End users must ensure they meet the storage 
requirements of classified information. Manufacturers must ensure products satisfies all 
standards. Misinterpretation of the requirements has led to incorrect storage of material, 
disputes on how to store material, and ineffective products submitted for testing. The 
recognition of changing, new, and satisfying needs is also apparent in the results, which 
lends insight to amendments and revisions. IACSE prioritizes the identification of need 
when initiating new specifications or amendments to existing specifications. The revision 
to FF-L-2890 is an example of a changing need addressed by the committee. FF-L-2890C 
includes four new “types” of pedestrian door assemblies that cover secondary door and exit 
only door applications, which do not include combination deadbolt locks (General Services 
Administration 2019). The need was informally introduced to the committee by 
government agencies who are increasing the size of secured areas. The greater secured area 
footprint requires more exits to meet life safety requirements. Also, IACSE emphasizes the 
specifications cannot be stagnant. Sustained development or continually review of the 
documents must be completed to identify elements overlooked in the past. The next three 
most mentioned codes understand deficiencies and recommended improvements from the 
subject matter experts, which were relevant and consistent with the systems engineering 
approach.  
First, three of the five experts noted an issue with receiving a detailed need from 
stakeholders, in particular, the need for a lock to secure classified network cables. 
Currently, locks meeting FF-P-110 do not satisfy end user needs due to usability and 
inability to withstand outdoor environments, but the IACSE is unsure of what exactly the 
need is. “For instance, when I was mentioning earlier with the National Security Agency 
(NSA) issue, we haven’t seen any white paper or anything written from their agency pushed 
up the chain to DoD or OUSDI asking for changes to a spec or creating a new spec to meet 
someone’s actual needs and requirements,” as claimed by Participant 2 (physical security 
specialist) in discussion on July 19, 2019. Therefore, the experts mentioned the creation of 
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descriptive documentation as a supplement to aid the specification development. A needs 
analysis directed by GSA to identify the true base operational needs through agency and 
end user interviews and written input would provide essential documentation for 
requirements development. 
Furthermore, the documentation would act as reference material to answer future 
inquiry into each requirement. All the experts also asserted the lack of supplemental 
documentation for testing requirements in some manner. Two supplementals emerged: a 
classified supplemental to detail the testing requirements for entry tests (forced, covert and 
surreptitious entry) and complete overall testing requirements for each specification. The 
supplement detailing testing procedures for the entry tests must be classified because public 
knowledge of entry techniques is accessible to enemy threats that could implement the 
techniques for unauthorized access to protected classified information. For this reason, it 
is recommended GSA establish supplemental unclassified and classified testing 
requirements for each specification. This would ensure consistency for tested products, 
letting manufacturers with the appropriate clearance to know how the product is tested, and 
comprehensive supplemental testing requirements. The supplements would allow the 
testing facility to defend determinations if questioned by submitting the manufacturer and 
solidify the program. The official recommendation backed by the interviews will act as the 
driving force for improvement.  
D. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The execution of the operational requirements and functional analysis were thought 
to identify requirements in the four specifications that are currently not present. However, 
the inability to collaborate with experts for each product did not make full inclusion of all 
requirements possible. Nevertheless, the execution of complete requirements and 
functional analysis would, at the very least, provide documentation on how the 
requirements were formulated. Currently, if a question as to why a particular requirement 
was included in a specification arises, the IACSE can only answer based on memory or 
expert reference. Documenting this knowledge would decrease the probability of the 
committee committing the same error in requirement development. Thus, we recommend 
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that GSA designate a team of experts to complete functional analysis for each specification 
as supplemental documentation. The analyses will act as working documents for the 
IACSE.    
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Physical security equipment has been developed through the implementation of 
federal specifications since 1954, resulting in reliable locking and storage systems for 
classified information. Nonetheless, specifications undergo numerous amendments and 
revisions to satisfy further end user needs that sometimes do not change but rather are not 
identified during the conception of specification requirements. The goal of the “system 
engineering approach is to justify these resource requirements through a top-down 
approach and to ensure the proper development of each through a fully integrated system” 
(Blanchard and Blyler 2016, 22). So, this research strived to answer the question: Can 
implementation of systems engineering processes improve the development of current 
design and performance requirements in physical security equipment federal 
specifications?  
The method to formulate a viable answer was to select four federal specifications, 
identify the most appropriate systems engineering tools for application, execute the 
systems engineering approach for each specification, analyze the results and determine 
whether the approach improves the requirements development process. As referenced in 
the discussion, the revealing of missing requirements was thought to be the concrete 
evidence required to confirm improvements. However, due to lack of resources and the 
direct involvement from the IACSE, the requirements and functional analysis could not be 
executed with all necessary inputs. Expert involvement for each locking and storage system 
would be required and is feasible if implemented by the governing agency, GSA. 
Nonetheless, the research did discover process improvements through the analyses and 
interviews.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The IACSE implements an effective specification requirements process and 
produces specifications that provide the warfighter with systems to secure classified 
information. This research has uncovered that the process is lacking formal analysis, 
procedural documentation, and a structure, which is the major advantage of the system 
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engineering approach. Thus, the simulation of the approach for the four specifications 
revealed the application of the following tools which will improve the process by providing 
documentation for reference, in-depth analysis of vital components leading to the accurate 
identification of stakeholder needs and a structured method for consistency in requirements 
development: 
• Establish a well-defined problem statement for each federal specification 
that clearly defines the end user need. The statement can be fluid based on 
the changing demands experienced in the field driven by advancements in 
technology. 
• Develop a communications plan for internal use to ensure all stakeholders 
are involved to the appropriate level through the requirements 
development process.  
• Create a needs analysis template (document or process within its own) to 
be administered when an agency contacts IACSE with the need for an 
alteration to an existing product or a new product. The tool will identify 
the true need through analysis rather than hearsay from an agency 
representative. 
• Develop detailed test plans for each specification, including classified 
supplemental for entry tests to document how each requirement is tested 
and promote consistency in testing. The plans should be working 
documents and evolve as new equipment or techniques are discovered.   
• Develop a functional analysis template for implementation on each 
specification that will supply a basis for all generated requirements. The 
analysis will provide IACSE a documented and visual aid to ensure the 
incorporation of all functions.  
The five recommendations have been presented to GSA and have received positive 
feedback thus far. Questions as to how to administer and who will be responsible for the 
actions will need to be finalized with input from the IACSE. The execution of the new 
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approach will, at the least, provide documentation, which is currently not available for GSA 
to reference when future development is required. Therefore, the research identified 
systems engineering tools that will improve the physical security equipment requirements 
development process.     
B. CONCLUSION 
The systems engineering approach implemented in the research is not only 
beneficial for the four specifications identified, but for all GSA owned physical security 
equipment specifications. The adoption of the methodology by GSA would take 
considerable time and effort, but the documentation and standardized approach would lead 
to a more exhaustive examination of requirements development. Comprehensive 
implementation includes involvement from a designated project manager and insight from 
end users, technicians, manufacturers, and all support components. Furthermore, GSA 
owns seven hundred and ninety federal specifications. Consideration of the methodology 
can be applied to federal specifications determined to be high priority products such as 
those that protect classified information. The inclusion of a systems engineering approach 
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APPENDIX A.  STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS RESULTS 
A. ELECTROMECHANICAL COMBINATION LOCK 
Below are the results of the FF-L-2740 Locks, Combination, Electromechanical 
stakeholder analysis. 
Table 10. FF-L-2740 Stakeholder Analysis Results 
Stakeholder Impact  Influence Category 
End user - - - 
Department of Defense High High Manage Closely 
Department of Energy Low Low Monitor 
State Department High High Manage Closely 
Department of Justice Low Low Monitor 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Medium Medium Monitor 
National Security Agency High High Manage Closely 
National Reconnaissance Office  Medium Medium Keep Informed 
Department of Homeland Security Medium Medium Manage Closely 
Government Contractors High Low Keep Informed 
Non-Title 50 Agencies Medium Low Keep Informed 
National Intelligence Community High  High Manage Closely 
Program Support Agencies       
Information Security Oversight Office 
(ISOO) High High Manage Closely 
Defense Security Service High  Medium Manage Closely 
Interagency Advisory Committee on 
Security Equipment (IACSE) High High Manage Closely 
General Services Administration Medium High Manage Closely 
DoD Lock Program Field Support Medium High Manage Closely 
DoD Lock Program Testing Facility High High Manage Closely 
GSA Certified Technicians & 
Inspectors High Low Keep Informed 
National Laboratories Low High Keep Informed 
Defense Logistics Agency Low Low Monitor 
GSA Approved Training Centers - - - 
Lockmasters Security Institute High Low Keep Informed 
MBA USA, Inc. High  Low Keep Informed 
Lock Manufacturers - - - 
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Stakeholder Impact  Influence Category 
Kaba Mas High Medium Manage Closely 
Sargent and Greenleaf  High Medium Manage Closely 
Container Manufacturers - - - 
Alpha Safe and Vault, Inc. High Medium Manage Closely 
Hamilton Products Group, Inc. High Medium Manage Closely 
Will-Burt Company High Medium Manage Closely 
A&H Security Cabinets, Inc. High Medium Manage Closely 
American Made Safe & Security, LLC.  High Medium Manage Closely 
Vault Door Manufacturers - - - 
Will-Burt Company High Medium Manage Closely 
Overly Manufacturing Co. High Medium Manage Closely 
Hamilton Products Group, Inc. High Medium Manage Closely 
International Vault, Inc. High Medium Manage Closely 
Brown Safe Manufacturing High Medium Manage Closely 
Accessory Manufacturers  - - - 
Lockmasters Low Low Monitor 
 
Figure 5. FF-L-2740 Stakeholder Prioritization Grid. Adapted from 
Thompson (n.d.). 
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B. PEDESTRIAN DOOR ASSEMBLY 
Below are the results of the FF-L-2890 Lock Extension (Pedestrians Door Lock 
Assembly Preassembled, Panic, and Auxiliary Deadbolt) stakeholder analysis. 
Table 11. FF-L-2890 Stakeholder Analysis Results 
Stakeholder Impact  Influence Category 
End user - - - 
Department of Defense High High Manage Closely  
Department of Energy Low Low Monitor 
State Department High High Manage Closely  
Department of Justice Low Low Monitor 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Medium Medium Monitor 
National Security Agency High High Manage Closely  
National Reconnaissance Office  Medium Medium Keep Informed 
Department of Homeland Security Medium Medium Manage Closely  
Government Contractors High Low Keep Informed 
Non-Title 50 Agencies Medium Low Monitor 
National Intelligence Community High  High Manage Closely  
Program Support Agencies       
Information Security Oversight 
Office (ISOO) High High Manage Closely  
Defense Security Service High  Medium Manage Closely  
Interagency Advisory Committee on 
Security Equipment (IACSE) 
High High 
Manage Closely  
General Services Administration Medium High Manage Closely  
DoD Lock Program Field Support Medium High Manage Closely  
DoD Lock Program Testing Facility High High Manage Closely  
GSA Certified Technicians & 
Inspectors High Low Keep Informed 
Defense Logistics Agency Low Low Monitor 
GSA Approved Training Centers - - - 
Lockmasters Security Institute High Low Keep Informed 
MBA USA, Inc. High  Low Keep Informed 
Lock Manufacturers - - - 
Kaba Mas High Medium Manage Closely  
Sargent and Greenleaf  High Medium Manage Closely  
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Stakeholder Impact  Influence Category 
Lock Extension Manufacturers - - - 
Kaba Mas High Medium Manage Closely  
Lockmasters  High Medium Manage Closely  
Sargent and Greenleaf  High Medium Manage Closely  
 




C. COMBINATION PADLOCK 
Below are the results of the FF-P-110 Padlock, Changeable Combination 
(Resistant to Opening by Manipulation and Surreptitious Attack) stakeholder analysis. 
Table 12. FF-P-110 Stakeholder Analysis Results 
Stakeholder Impact  Influence Category 
End user - - - 
Department of Defense High High Manage Closely 
Department of Energy Low Low Monitor 
State Department High High Manage Closely 
Department of Justice Low Low Monitor 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Medium Medium Monitor 
National Security Agency High High Manage Closely 
National Reconnaissance Office  Medium Medium Keep Informed 
Department of Homeland Security Medium Medium Manage Closely 
Government Contractors High Low Keep Informed 
Non-Title 50 Agencies Medium Low Monitor 
National Intelligence Community Low Low Monitor 
Program Support Agencies       
Information Security Oversight Office 
(ISOO) High High Manage Closely 
Defense Security Service High  Medium Manage Closely 
Interagency Advisory Committee on 
Security Equipment (IACSE) High High Manage Closely 
General Services Administration Medium High Manage Closely 
DoD Lock Program Field Support Medium High Manage Closely 
DoD Lock Program Testing Facility High High Manage Closely 
GSA Certified Technicians & 
Inspectors High Low Keep Informed 
GSA Approved Training Centers - - - 
Lockmasters Security Institute High Low Keep Informed 
MBA USA, Inc. High  Low Keep Informed 
Lock Manufacturers - - - 
Sargent and Greenleaf  High Medium Manage Closely 
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Figure 7. FF-P-110 Stakeholder Prioritization Grid. Adapted from 
Thompson (n.d.). 
D. SECURITY CABINET 
Below are the results of the AA-F-358 Filing Cabinet, Legal and Letter Size, 
Uninsulated stakeholder analysis. 
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Table 13. AA-F-358 Stakeholder Analysis Results 
Stakeholder Impact  Influence Category 
End user - - - 
Department of Defense High High Manage Closely 
Department of Energy Low Low Monitor 
State Department High High Manage Closely 
Department of Justice Low Low Monitor 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Medium Medium Monitor 
National Security Agency High High Manage Closely 
National Reconnaissance Office  Medium Medium Keep Informed 
Department of Homeland Security Medium Medium Manage Closely 
Government Contractors High Low Keep Informed 
Non-Title 50 Agencies Medium  Low Monitor 
National Intelligence Community High  High Manage Closely 
Program Support Agencies - - - 
Information Security Oversight 
Office (ISOO) High High Manage Closely 
Defense Security Service High Medium Manage Closely 
Interagency Advisory Committee on 
Security Equipment (IACSE) High High Manage Closely 
General Services Administration Medium High Manage Closely 
DoD Lock Program Field Support Medium High Manage Closely 
DoD Lock Program Testing Facility High High Manage Closely 
GSA Certified Technicians & 
Inspectors High Low Keep Informed 
Container Manufacturers - - - 
Alpha Safe and Vault, Inc. High Medium Manage Closely 
Hamilton Products Group, Inc. High Medium Manage Closely 
Will-Burt Company High Medium Manage Closely 
A&H Security Cabinets, Inc. High Medium Manage Closely 
American Made Safe & Security, 
LLC.  High Medium Manage Closely 
GSA Approved Training Centers - - - 
Lockmasters Security Institute High Low Keep Informed 
MBA USA, Inc. High Low Keep Informed 
Lock Manufacturers - - - 
Kaba Mas High Medium Manage Closely 
Sargent and Greenleaf  High Medium Manage Closely 
Accessory Manufacturers  - - - 
Lockmasters Low Low Monitor 
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Figure 8. AA-F-358 Stakeholder Prioritization Grid. Adapted from 
Thompson (n.d.). 
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APPENDIX B.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND QUALITATIVE 
ANALYSIS RESULT 
General Questions: 
1) How would you characterize an effective physical security equipment 
specification? 
2) What typically prompts the creation of a new specification? 
3) What typically prompts a modification to a current specification? 
4) What is the established procedure for developing physical security 
equipment specifications? 
5) How would you improve the specification development process? 
6) What data could be utilized to determine specification effectiveness?  
7) How could improvements to a specification be measured? 
 
Specification Specific Questions: 
8) To what extent does (FF-L-2740, FF-L-2890, FF-P-110, AA-F-358) 
currently satisfy end user needs? Score from 1 to 5.  
1 being does not satisfy, 5 being fully satisfies.  
Why is the highest-ranked that way? 
Why is the lowest-ranked that way? 
 
9) To what extent does (FF-L-2740, FF-L-2890, FF-P-110, AA-F-358) 
specification provide adequate detail? Score from 1 to 5.  
1 being inadequate amount, 5 being the optimal amount.  
Why is the highest-ranked that way? 
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Why is the lowest-ranked that way? 
10) To what extent has (FF-L-2740, FF-L-2890, FF-P-110, AA-F-358) 
produced an adequate product? Score from 1 to 5.  
 1 being inadequate products, 5 being an optimal product. 
Why is the highest-ranked that way? 
Why is the lowest-ranked that way? 
 
11) To what extent does (FF-L-2740, FF-L-2890, FF-P-110, AA-F-358) require 
any immediate improvements? Score from 1 to 5. 
 1 being requires little to no improvements, 5 being requires immediate 
improvements.  
Why is the highest-ranked that way? 
Why is the lowest-ranked that way? 
Table 14. Qualitative Data Analysis Code Frequency Output. 
Adapted from Provalis Research (n.d.) 
Category Code  Description  Count Cases 
Evaluation Clarity The specification requirements must be clear. 15 5 
Evaluation Changing Needs Evolving needs from the field must be 
continuously evaluated. 
13 4 
Evaluation Need Met It is determined essential for the specification 
to meet the end user need effectively. 
10 4 
Development Sustained Development 
Modifications are natural through sustained 
development, which has resulted in viable 
products. 
8 4 
Development New Need A new need provided by the field prompts the 
creation and modification of a specification. 
6 5 
Deficiencies NSA Lock Need 
NSA requires a new padlock that has not been 
formally communicated. The requirements are 
not detailed.  
6 3 
Improvements Classified Testing 
Add a classified testing plan as a supplemental 
to each specification. 
6 2 
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Category Code  Description  Count Cases 
Improvements Need Analysis Implementation of a needs analysis would 
improve specification development. 
5 4 
Development Technique Change 
Change in testing or attack techniques can 
prompt specification modification.  
5 4 
Evaluation Data Query from End users 
End user input from the DoD Lock Program 
hotline can be used to measure effectiveness. 
5 3 
Development Policy Policy changes or new policy prompts the 
creation or modification of specifications.  
5 3 
Development IACSE Review 
IACSE is responsible for the review of the 
need, determines the validity, and prompts 
modification or creation of specification. 
5 3 
Deficiencies White Paper Agencies verbally communicate need instead 
of submitting a formal white paper. 
5 2 
Deficiencies Unclear Testing Requirements 
Some performance or design requirements are 
unclear in current specifications.  
4 2 
Deficiencies Lack of Manufacturers 
Lack of manufacturers submitting to 
specifications, which results in a lack of 
product options. 
3 3 
Deficiencies Newer Specification 
New specifications undergo natural iterations 






Federal Standardization Manual utilized for 






The number of products sold can determine 
the effectiveness of a specification.  
3 2 
Development Events An event prompts the development of the 
specification. 
3 2 
Deficiencies Needs Statement Need end users do not supply a statement. 3 2 
Deficiencies Too Restrictive Requirements may be too detailed, restricting 
the possibility of viable designs. 
3 2 
Development Unknown Procedure 
A formal procedure for specification 






Some performance or design requirements are 
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APPENDIX C.  FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS HIERARCHY 
DIAGRAMS 
A. ELECTROMECHANICAL COMBINATION LOCK 
 
Figure 9. FF-L-2740 Prime Function 
 
Figure 10. FF-L-2740 1.0 Function Diagram 
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Figure 11. FF-L-2740 2.0 Function Diagram 
 
Figure 12. FF-L-2740 3.0 Function Diagram 
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Figure 13. FF-L-2740 4.0 Function Diagram 
 
Figure 14. FF-L-2740 5.0 Function Diagram 
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Figure 15. FF-L-2740 6.0 Function Diagram 
B. PEDESTRIAN DOOR ASSEMBLY 
 
Figure 16. FF-L-2890 Prime Function 
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Figure 17. FF-L-2890 1.0 Function Diagram 
 
Figure 18. FF-L-2890 2.0 Function Diagram 
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Figure 19. FF-L-2890 3.0 Function Diagram 
 
Figure 20. FF-L-2890 4.0 Function Diagram 
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Figure 21. FF-L-2890 5.0 Function Diagram 
 
Figure 22. FF-L-2890 6.0 Function Diagram 
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C. COMBINATION PADLOCK 
 
Figure 23. FF-P-110 Prime Function 
 
Figure 24. FF-P-110 1.0 Function Diagram  
 
Figure 25. FF-P-110 2.0 Function Diagram 
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Figure 26. FF-P-110 3.0 Function Diagram 
 
Figure 27. FF-P-110 4.0 Function Diagram 
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D. SECURITY CABINET 
 
Figure 28. AA-F-358 Prime Function 
  
Figure 29. AA-F-358 1.0 Function Diagram 
 
Figure 30. AA-F-358 2.0 Function Diagram 
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Figure 31. AA-F-358 3.0 Function Diagram 
 
Figure 32. AA-F-358 4.0 Function Diagram 
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